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Abstract
Background: The Tanzanian health insurance system comprises multiple health insurance funds targeting different
population groups but which operate in parallel, with no mechanisms for redistribution across the funds.
Establishing such redistributive mechanisms requires public support, which is grounded on the level of solidarity
within the country. The aim of this paper is to analyse the perceptions of CHF, NHIF and non-member households
towards cross-subsidisation of the poor as an indication of the level of solidarity and acceptance of redistributive
mechanisms.
Methods: This study analyses data collected from a survey of 695 households relating to perceptions of household
heads towards cross-subsidisation of the poor to enable them to access health services. Kruskal-Wallis test is used
to compare perceptions by membership status. Generalized ordinal logistic regression models are used to identify
factors associated with support for cross-subsidisation of the poor.
Results: Compared to CHF and NHIF households, non-member households expressed the highest support for
subsidised CHF membership for the poor. The odds of expressing support for subsidised CHF membership are
higher for NHIF households and non-member households, households that are wealthier, whose household heads
have lower education levels, and have sick members. The majority of households support a partial rather than fully
subsidised CHF membership for the poor and there were no significant differences by membership status. The odds
of expressing willingness to contribute towards subsidised CHF membership are higher for households that are
wealthier, with young household heads and have confidence in scheme management.
Conclusion: The majority may support a redistributive policy, but there are indications that this support and
willingness to contribute to its achievement are influenced by the perceived benefits, amount of subsidy
considered, and trust in scheme management. These present important issues for consideration when designing
redistributive policies.
Keywords: Health insurance, Redistributive mechanisms, Solidarity
Background
The Tanzanian health care system is financed from vari-
ous sources, including taxation, donor funding, out-of-
pocket (OOP) payments, and prepayment schemes. Dur-
ing the 2011/12 financial year, government funding was
the dominant source of financing for the health sector,
contributing 59% to health expenditures. During the
same period, donor funding contributed 41% to the
health sector budget [1]. Out of pocket expenditures as
a percentage of total health spending was estimated at
32.3% in 2009/10 [2]. With an estimated 14% of the
population enrolled in the prepayment schemes, the ma-
jority of Tanzanians have to pay for health services at
the point of use [1].
In an effort to increase enrolment into prepayment
schemes, Tanzania adopted a health financing strategy
aimed at achieving universal coverage through the estab-
lishment of a number of health insurance schemes target-
ing specific population groups. The main health insurance
schemes currently in operation include the National
Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) for public sector em-
ployees (and more recently self-employed, employees from
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private companies, associations and non-governmental
organisations, students and clergymen), the Community
Health Fund (CHF) for the rural and informal popula-
tion (and its urban equivalent, TIKA) and the Social
Health Insurance Benefit (SHIB) for formal private sec-
tor employees who are members of the National Social
Security Fund (NSSF). In addition there are various pri-
vate health insurance funds mostly covering those in
the formal sector through their employers and micro-
insurance schemes mostly covering informal sector
workers [3,4].
Currently, the CHF and NHIF are the predominant
funds, covering about 6.6% and 7.2% respectively of the
country’s population of 44 million [1,5]. Of the two
funds, the NHIF is more successful in enrolment and
mobilisation of revenue since membership is mandatory
and the funding is automatically deducted from member
employee salaries. The challenge remains not only to scale
up coverage but also to integrate the existing schemes to
achieve the broad level of risk pooling demanded by uni-
versal coverage. Inherent in the integration of the existing
health insurance schemes is the establishment of a redis-
tributive mechanism that would enable financial transfers
to counter differential risk distribution and revenue gener-
ation abilities across the schemes. This will guarantee uni-
versal access to a basic package of health services, which is
the essence of universal coverage.
Redistributive policies demand a level of solidarity,
which must exist within a society. Solidarity refers to the
willingness to act in the interest of others in need [6,7].
Experience from countries that implemented reforms to
achieve greater redistribution demonstrates that a high
level of solidarity is a necessary ingredient to the achieve-
ment of universal coverage [8]. Support for redistributive
policies is grounded on the level of solidarity within the
country. Beliefs about solidarity provide an indication of
the level of solidarity since these reflect the motivations
behind acts of solidarity. Understanding what shapes these
beliefs provides important information for developing re-
distributive policies.
Notions of self-interested or other-regarding prefer-
ences determine whether an individual will express sup-
port for redistributive policies. Theories that dwell on
self-interested behaviour assert that individuals are less
interested in the wellbeing of others and are driven pri-
marily by self-gain. This should be important since indi-
viduals are affected differently by redistributive policies,
with some likely to be net ‘recipients’ in the redistribu-
tion, while others more likely to be net ‘payers’ [8-13]. In
this regard, it is expected that the less wealthy, older, less
educated and non-members (non-insured) are more
likely to express support for redistributive policies.
The notion of self-interested preferences has been
challenged by evidence that individuals are not driven
entirely by self-gain, but tend to exhibit other-regarding
preferences as well [14-21]. Other-regarding preferences
differ in the motivation behind caring about the welfare
of others. This motivation may be based on altruism,
which emanates from the ability to empathise with
others [6,22-27]. From this theoretical insight, we expect
being female and living in a household with members
reporting illness to positively influence perceptions to-
wards redistributive policies. Individuals may also extend
kindness towards others in order to fulfil social and
moral obligations. In this way individuals are more likely
to express support for redistributive policies if they have
expectations that they will also benefit through reci-
procity, praise or avoidance of guilt or social reprimand
associated with failing to help others [23,24,28,29].
Contextual factors such as confidence in the institu-
tions given the mandate to implement redistributive pol-
icies play a significant role in public support [7,21,30].
Ulrich [7] and Arhinful [30] contend that a lack of confi-
dence in the sustainability and the ability of institutions
such as insurance schemes to deliver the expected bene-
fits may negatively influence people’s support for redis-
tributive policies. This paper has used the level of trust
in CHF and NHIF management as measures of the con-
fidence in the ability of these institutions to meet expec-
tations of the respective members. It is expected that a
high level of trust is likely to positively influence percep-
tions towards redistributive policies.
This paper analyses the perceptions of CHF, NHIF and
non-member households towards cross-subsidisation of
the poor as an indication of the level of solidarity and
acceptance of redistributive policies. Specifically the
paper examines (1) the level of support for redistribution
to poorer segments of the population, making compari-
sons across the three household groups. This was mea-
sured by the proportion of the households from each
group expressing support towards subsidised CHF mem-
bership for the poor and willingness to contribute to-
wards achieving this, (2) the extent of redistribution (the
amount of subsidy to the poor) that is likely to be sup-
ported and how it compares across the three household
groups. This was measured by the proportion of house-
holds from each group expressing support for different
categories of subsidy, and (3) the determinants of sup-
port for redistributive mechanisms. The next section
provides the methods used, followed by the results, dis-
cussion and finally the conclusion.
Methods
This study was part of a larger study examining equity in
health insurance, conducted in Kongwa and Mpwapwa
districts in Tanzania over a period of eight weeks between
July and September 2011. The two districts were selected
due to their different levels of CHF enrolment, and for
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convenience in terms of logistics and costs. Kongwa has a
total of 63,612 households of which 5,800 (9%) were regis-
tered with CHF. Mpwapwa has a total of 78,812 house-
holds of which 15,540 (18%) were registered with CHF
[31]. The prime economic activity in both districts is agri-
culture and livestock keeping.
Sampling method and Sample Size
In each district multistage sampling was used to select
first wards, then villages, followed by hamletsa and fi-
nally households. A household is defined as a person or
group of people related or unrelated who live together
and share a common pot of foodb. For the purpose of
this study the household definition was extended to in-
clude persons who share the same membership card
(CHF households) or are dependents of the same principal
memberc (NHIF households). The study population com-
prised all households in the two districts that met this def-
inition. Due to difficulties in identification of households
by membership status from the village household registerd,
equal numbers of households were selected from listings
of each membership category as follows: CHF households
were randomly selected from the CHF register book kept
in the health facilities in each ward. This was because
health facilities are registration points for CHF member-
ship. The health facilities were selected based on whether
the facility catchment area falls within the selected ham-
lets. To ensure only current CHF members were included,
the selection was made from members registered from
September 2010 to September 2011.
For NHIF households, a list of all Government institu-
tions in the selected wards or villages was obtained from
the District Council, from which all of the NHIF princi-
pal members available at the time of the study were se-
lected. This approach was used to ensure achievement of
NHIF sample size since there are relatively fewer NHIF
members at the ward or village level. Non-member house-
holds were randomly selected from the village household
register in each of the selected villages. All CHF and NHIF
households were omitted from the village register using
the list obtained from the facility and District Council re-
spectively before selection of non-member households.
Sample size was calculated based on the reported CHF
enrolment rate in each district (11% in Kongwa and 27%
in Mpwapwa) and a power of 80%. This resulted in a re-
quired sample size of 106 households per group per dis-
trict. To this, 25 households were added in each group
to ensure achievement of sample size. In total 786
households were contacted for interview.
Data collection
A pre-tested structured questionnaire was administered
to the household head or spouse. Three return visits
were made to households where members were not
available for interview during the first visit. This resulted in
a response rate of 88%, with a sample size of 695 house-
holds, of which 224 were NHIF members, 233 were CHF
members and 238 were non-members. Data were collected
on demographic characteristics, employment, education
level, family size, the presence of chronic and acute ill-
nesses, membership status, household ownership of assets
and consumer durables and perceptions concerning trust
in scheme management, subsidised CHF membership for
the poor and the willingness to contribute towards this
end, and the amount of subsidy that should be considered.
Study variables
Dependent variables
The dependent variables used in the analysis were re-
sponses to three statements or questions regarding per-
ceptions towards cross-subsidisation and redistribution
to the poor. The responses were measured on the Likert
scale [32-34]. The first statement was ‘Poor members of
the community should be facilitated to join the CHF
without paying the contribution’, for which responses
ranged from ‘1 = very strongly disagree to 5 = very
strongly agree’. This question measured determinants of
the support for subsidised CHF membership for the
poor. The second question measured determinants of
the amount of subsidy likely to be supported and asked,
‘to what extent should the poor be financially assisted to
join the CHF?’ The response ranged from ‘none of the
contribution = 1, some of the contribution = 2, half of
the contribution = 3, most of the contribution = 4 to all of
the contribution = 5’. The third question measured deter-
minants of willingness to contribute towards subsidised
CHF membership. For this question, NHIF, CHF and non-
member households were each asked two questions: for
CHF and non-member households, questions measured
willingness to 1) accept and 2) contribute towards subsi-
dised CHF membership for the poor. For NHIF house-
holds, questions measured willingness to 1) contribute
towards subsidised CHF membership for poor individuals
and 2) use of NHIF revenue to cross-subsidise the CHF
scheme. For all willingness questions the responses ranged
from ‘1 = definitely unwilling to 5 = definitely willing’.
Independent variables
The unit of analysis for this study was the household
since membership to the CHF is household based. The
study used household head characteristics (to represent
household decisions) and household characteristics.
Household head characteristics variables included age,
sex and education level. Age was categorized into three
groups (18–35; 36–59; 60 and above). Education level
was categorized into four mutually exclusive groups
(none, up to Primary, up to Secondary and above
Secondary). The household characteristics included three
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household level variables- wealth status, membership sta-
tus and presence of household members reporting an ill-
ness during the four week (acute) or three month
(chronic) recall period used in this study. Wealth status
was an asset index used as a proxy for household socio-
economic status. Principal Components Analysis was used
to develop this index by grouping households into quin-
tiles based on ownership of assets and durable goods. This
method has been used in studies done in developing coun-
tries to develop indices as proxies for income or wealth
status owing to the complexities of determining actual in-
come [35,36]. Membership status was operationalised as
‘1’ for CHF, ‘2’ for NHIF and ‘3’ for non-members. Presence
of sick members in the household was operationalised by
the means of a dummy variable equalling ‘1’ if an illness
had been reported in the household and ‘0’ if there was
none. This variable was created from individual household
variables that measured the experience of illness among
members within each household during the study recall
period, which were obtained for addressing other objec-
tives of the larger study. A district variable was also in-
cluded to control for variations between the two districts.
Analysis
The study used Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test of equality of
populations to compare perceptions among the CHF,
NHIF and non-member households. Kruskal-Wallis is a
non-parametric version of ANOVA that is used when the
dependant variable is ordinal in nature [32,37]. Three gen-
eralized ordinal logistic regression models were used to
identify factors associated with (1) support for subsiding
CHF membership (2) the amount of subsidy supported
and (3) willingness to contribute towards subsidised CHF
membership for the poor. Ordinal logistic regression is
the model of choice when the dependent variable is or-
dinal in nature, but the Proportional Odds Assumption
(or parallel regression assumption) with which it operates
often precludes its use [38]. For this reason, the general-
ized model that relaxes the Proportional Odds Assump-
tion was preferred.
Ethical considerations
The study proposal was reviewed and approved by
Muhimbili University of Health and Social Sciences
(MUHAS) Ethics Committee and permission to conduct
the study was sought and granted from the relevant au-
thorities at the district, ward and village levels. Informed
consent was obtained from all respondents.
Results
Descriptive Characteristics of the sample
We obtained complete information on 695 households.
Of these households, 224 (32%) were registered with
NHIF, 233 (34%) with CHF and 238 (34%) were non-
member households. The majority (about 85%) of NHIF
households belonged to the highest two wealth quintiles,
while 58% of CHF and 56% of non-member households
belonged to the lowest two quintiles (ρ < 0.05). CHF
households, with a mean household size of 5.3 (Q2 = 5,
IQR = 7–4), were larger than NHIF (Q2 = 4, IQR = 6-2)
and non- member households (Q2 = 5, IQR = 6–3), which
both had a mean size of 4.7 members. Education levels
were higher among NHIF heads of households, with 63%
having attained secondary or above secondary education,
while the majority of CHF (72%) and non-members (64%)
household heads had attained primary education. In about
19% of NHIF, 16% of CHF and 25% of non-member
households the household heads were female (Table 1).
Household perceptions towards subsidised CHF membership
The median response to the statement ‘Poor members
of the community should be facilitated to join the CHF
without paying contribution’ was ‘strongly agree’
Table 1 Descriptive Characteristics of households in
sample (%)
NHIF
(n = 224)
CHF
(n = 233)
Non-member
(n = 238)
Wealth status
Lowest 1.3 29.2 31.5
Second 2.7 29.2 24.4
Third 10.7 23.6 25.2
Fourth 34.4 13.7 12.6
Highest 50.9 4.3 6.3
Household size
(Mean = 4.7 SD = 2.3)
1-5 72.3 56.2 69.3
6 and above 27.7 43.8 30.7
Presence of sick member
No 18.3 11.2 20.2
Yes 81.7 88.8 80.8
Age (head)
(Mean = 42.7 SD = 13.5)
18-35 yrs 38.8 33.1 30.3
36-59 yrs 56.3 51.5 55.9
60+ yrs 4.9 15.5 13.9
Sex (head)
Male 81.3 84.1 75.2
Female 18.8 15.9 24.8
Education (head)
No education 1.4 20.7 30.7
Up to primary 8.1 72.0 63.8
Up to–secondary 27.9 6.5 5.0
Above secondary 62.6 0.9 0.4
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(Q1 = ‘strongly agree’, Q3 = ‘very strongly agree’).
Non-member households expressed the highest support,
with a median response of ‘very strongly agree’
(Q1 = ‘strongly agree’, Q3 = ‘very strongly agree’)
(Figure 1). KW test showed that non-member house-
holds had significantly different responses from CHF
and NHIF households (p < 0.05).
Regression analysis showed that compared to CHF
members, the odds of NHIF members expressing agree-
ment for subsidised CHF membership for the poor ver-
sus disagreement were 2.4 times greater. The odds of
expressing agreement versus disagreement were 2.1
times greater for non-members compared to CHF mem-
bers. Where the household head had a lower level of
education, the odds of expressing agreement versus dis-
agreement were 1.5 times higher compared to where the
household head was not educated. The odds of express-
ing agreement versus disagreement were 1.7 times
higher when there was a sick member in the household
compared to when there was none. The odds of express-
ing agreement for subsidised CHF membership for the
poor versus disagreement were lower for wealthier
households in the third (OR 0.4), fourth (OR 0.5) and
highest (OR 0. 5) wealth quintiles compared to house-
holds in the lowest wealth quintile (Table 2).
Household perceptions towards the amount of subsidy
The majority of households supported a partial rather
than fully subsidised CHF membership for the poor. As il-
lustrated by Figure 2, the median response to the question
‘to what extent should the poor be financially assisted to
join the CHF?’ was ‘half of the contribution’ (Q1 = ‘some
of the contribution’, Q3 = ‘most of the contribution’). KW
test showed differences in responses between the CHF,
NHIF and non-member households were not significant.
Regarding the regression results, the odds of expressing
support for a higher subsidy for the poor versus a lower
subsidy were lower for households in the second (OR 0.8),
third (OR 0.5), fourth (OR 0.6) and highest (OR 0.6)
wealth quintiles compared to households in the lowest
wealth quintile. Where the household head was elderly,
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Figure 1 Household perceptions towards subsidised CHF
membership for the poor by membership status (%).
Table 2 Generalised ordinal logistic regression model for
household perceptions towards subsidised CHF
membership of the poor
Odds ratio Robust std. error
Membership status
CHFa
NHIF 2.414** 0.712
Non-members 2.129*** 0.372
Household wealth
Lowesta
Second 0.676 0.167
Third 0.419*** 0.104
Fourth 0.533** 0.143
Highest 0.524** 0.148
Age (household head)
18-35a
36-59 0.964 0.157
60+ 1.174 0.277
Sex (household head)
Malea
Female 1.159 0.216
Education level (household head)
Nonea
Up to primary 1.452* 0.319
Up to secondary 1.073 0.371
Above secondary 0.712 0.271
Presence of sick members
Noa
Yes 1.736** 0.354
Trust in fund management
Strongly disagreea
Disagree 0.540 0.216
Neither 0.563 0.206
Agree 0.490* 0.179
Strongly agree 1.899 0.863
District (Kongwaa)
Mpwapwa 1.201 0.193
*ρ < 0.1, **ρ < 0.05, ***ρ < 0.01; areference category; response categories
dichotomized into the highest category versus the lower categories.
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the odds of expressing support for a higher subsidy versus
a lower subsidy were 1.8 times higher compared to house-
holds with younger household heads (Table 3).
Household willingness to participate in redistributive
mechanisms
Table 4 illustrates the households’ willingness to partici-
pate in redistributive mechanisms for each membership
category. More than 70% of CHF households expressed
willingness to continue membership even though poor
households would be allowed to join the scheme without
paying the contribution. Almost a third of the same
households were not willing to increase their contribu-
tion to enable poor members of the community to join
without paying the contribution.
Among non-member households 91% expressed willing-
ness to accept subsidised membership for the poor while
84% expressed willingness to contribute towards achieving
this. A higher proportion of NHIF households expressed
willingness to contribute towards cross-subsidising the
CHF scheme as a whole (60%) compared to those that
expressed willingness towards subsidising CHF member-
ship for poor individuals (50%).
Results from the regression analysis are presented in
Table 5. For CHF households in the third (OR 1.8), fourth
(OR 2.3) and highest (OR 9.3) wealth quintiles, the odds
of expressing willingness to contribute towards subsidised
CHF membership for the poor versus unwillingness were
higher compared to those in the lowest wealth quintile.
For CHF households where the household heads were
aged between 36–59 years, the odds of expressing willing-
ness versus unwillingness were 1.9 timers higher com-
pared to those where household heads were younger (18–
35 years). The odds of expressing willingness versus un-
willingness were 4.5 times higher for households that
expressed confidence in scheme management compared
to those that did not. For NHIF households, where house-
hold heads had a higher education level, the odds of
expressing willingness versus unwillingness were 0.1 times
lower compared to those where the household head had a
lower education level.
Discussion
This study explored the perceptions of CHF, NHIF and
non-member households towards cross-subsidisation of
the poor as an indication of the level of solidarity and
acceptance of redistributive mechanisms. Our analysis
shows that among these households, there is a high level
of expressed support for subsidised CHF membership for
the poor. However, there is a disparity between expressed
support and willingness to contribute towards subsidised
CHF membership, especially among CHF and NHIF
households. Furthermore the majority of households
favour a partial rather than full subsidy for the poor.
Perceptions towards subsidising CHF membership for
the poor
Being a non-member increases the odds of expressing
higher support. The higher the education levels of the
household head the lower the support for subsidised CHF
membership. These findings are consistent with theory
that self-interest influences support for redistributive pol-
icies. Our findings also corroborate those from empirical
studies showing that individuals vulnerable to financial
shocks (older, female, low income, uninsured or minimal
education) have the highest support for redistributive pol-
icies [8-13,39-41]. Guided by self-interest, disadvantaged
individuals are likely to benefit more from redistributive
policies hence show greater support. Uncertainty about
the risk of future loss and the desire for a sense of security
makes non-members more likely to support redistributive
policies. A higher level of education increases prospects of
higher income and better wellbeing, thereby reducing the
expected benefits of redistribution. Indeed our results
show that the majority (87%) of household heads with sec-
ondary education and above are NHIF members, who also
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Figure 2 Perceptions towards the amount of subsidy for CHF membership of the poor by membership status (%).
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happen to be relatively wealthier than CHF and non-
member households.
Having a household member reporting illness increases
the odds of expressing support for subsidised CHF mem-
bership and preference for a higher subsidy. James and
Savedoff [13] and Harris et. al [42] also reported similar
findings. This finding is also in accordance with the the-
ory of altruistic behaviour which is based on feelings of
empathy that enable one to experience what the other is
feeling, thus encouraging acts of compassion [22-24,43].
Emphatic attitudes develop as individuals go through
life, being exposed to different types of social relation-
ships [6,22,25-27]. Hence, individuals who have inter-
acted with the poor or sick, or who have experienced
the responsibility of caring for others, for instance those
caring for sick family members, are more likely to empa-
thise with others going through similar experiences [26].
Self-interest may also increase the odds of expressing sup-
port, since households with a sick member would benefit
more from subsidised membership than those without.
However, our findings also show that households report-
ing a sick member included wealthy households as well as
NHIF households that would not be eligible for subsidised
CHF membership. Therefore it more likely that support
for subsidised CHF membership stemmed from altruism
rather than self-interest.
Except for experience of illness in a household, other
variables do not influence perceptions towards the
amount of subsidy that should be given to the poor. Des-
pite this, our findings showed that the majority expressed
support for subsidising a partial, rather than the full mem-
bership contribution. This corroborates findings of James
and Savedoff [13] and implies that there are sentiments
that the poor should make some contribution towards se-
curing their health. It has been recognised that people
tend to oppose redistributive policies when they feel that
it reduces incentives for the poor to bear their share of the
burden [25]. It could be that people want to avoid the ‘free
rider effect’ of providing the full subsidy, where the benefi-
ciaries of subsidised membership may take advantage of
the policy. This could give the impression that not all poor
people are too destitute to pay even a portion of the con-
tribution. It could also be that the poor are expected to
make a contribution to demonstrate the ‘value’ they place
on the subsidised membership received. However, the
findings depart from the experience of Ghana and Rwanda
where fully subsidised membership for the poor has been
implemented [44,45]. This raises questions about why the
sentiments towards a full subsidy would differ between
countries of similar developing country context. A better
understanding of the underlying reasons for supporting a
partial rather than full subsidy is required.
These findings imply that while the majority of house-
holds generally support subsidised CHF membership,
the degree of support differs depending on the perceived
benefits and the amount of subsidy under consideration.
Individuals who may not directly benefit from such a pol-
icy (the insured, higher educated) are likely to express less
support for subsidised membership. It has been argued
that other-regarding behaviour is motivated by expecta-
tions of reciprocated kindness, of praise and recognition,
or as a way to avoid feelings of guilt or social isolation
Table 3 Generalised ordinal logistic regression model for
household perceptions towards the amount of subsidised
CHF membership
Odds ratio Robust std. error
Membership status
CHFa
NHIF 1.187 0.508
Non-members 1.357 0.268
Household wealth
Lowesta
Second 0.838 0.194
Third 0.513** 0.135
Fourth 0.617 0.183
Highest 0.550 0.189
Age (household head)
18-35a
36-59 0.795 0.140
60+ 1.775* 0.522
Sex (household head)
Malea
Female 0.790 0.152
Education level (household head)
Nonea
Up to primary 1.048 0.216
Up to secondary 1.425 0.656
Above secondary 1.425 0.648
Presence of sick household member
Noa
Yes 1.196 0.263
Trust in fund management
Strongly disagreea
Disagree 1.159 0.464
Neither 0.795 0.287
Agree 0.905 0.324
Strongly agree 1.548 0.587
District (Kongwaa)
Mpwapwa 1.474 0.250
*ρ < 0.1, **ρ < 0.05; areference category; response categories dichotomized
into the highest category versus the lower categories.
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Table 4 Household willingness to contribute towards subsidised CHF membership for the poor (%)
Questions N Not willing Not sure Willing
CHF households
Are you willing to continue membership if poor members of the community are allowed to
join the CHF without paying the contribution?
233 21.7 5.6 73.3
Are you willing to increase your contribution so that poor members of the community are
allowed to join the CHF without paying the contribution?
233 44.4 10.7 45.1
NHIF households
Given the choice, are you willing to allow the NHIF scheme to use member contributions to
provide additional funds to schemes with poor members?
224 31.7 9.4 59.1
Given the choice, will you be willing to allow part of NHIF funds to be used for paying the
contribution on behalf of poorer members of the community in order to enable them to
join a health insurance scheme?
224 38.8 11.2 49.1
Non-member households
Are you willing to join the CHF scheme if poor members of the community are allowed to
join without paying the contribution?
238 5.5 3.8 90.7
Are you willing to join the CHF scheme and pay higher contribution to enable the poor to
join without paying the contribution?
238 6.7 8.8 83.7
Table 5 Generalised ordinal logistic regression model for households’ willingness to contribute towards subsidised
CHF membership
Variable CHF NHIF Non-members
Odds ratio Robust std. err Odds ratio Robust std. err. Odds ratio Robust std. err.
Wealth status (lowesta)
Second 1.455 0.523 0.626 1.073 1.630 0.569
Third 1.806* 0.616 0.800 1.284 0.994 0.368
Fourth 2.335* 1.164 1.904 3.046 1.014 0.434
Highest 9.304*** 5.562 2.761 4.459 0.578 0.301
Age (head, 18–35a)
36-59 1.877** 0.528 1.108 0.322 0.751 0.237
60+ 1.170 0.443 1.078 0.624 1.006 0.450
Sex (head, malea)
Female 1.345 0.462 1.617 0.534 0.604 0.200
Education level (head, no educationa)
Up to primary 0.868 0.234 0.203 0.223 1.179 0.390
Up to secondary 0.797 0.459 0.126* 0.129 0.739 0.571
Above secondary 0.358 0.224 0.120* 0.121 1.050 0.749
Presence of sick members (noa)
Yes 0.602 0.243 1.085 0.424 1.437 0.471
Trust in scheme management (strongly disagreea)
Disagree 1.473 1.288 1.128 0.698 1.717 1.098
Neither agree nor disagree 1.360 0.979 1.050 0.584 0.688 0.422
Agree 4.455** 3.206 1.327 0.722 1.004 0.606
Strongly agree 2.247 1.873 2.136 2.106 2.465 1.884
District (Kongwaa)
Mpwapwa 1.031 0.726 1.525 0.412 0.957 0.258
*ρ < 0.1, **ρ < 0.05, ***ρ < 0.01; areference category; response categories dichotomized into the highest category versus the lower categories.
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associated with failing to help others [23,24,28,29]. Hence,
other-regarding preferences are often viewed as indirect
expressions of self-interest [30,39]. From this perspective,
support for redistributive policies can be promoted by fo-
cusing on extended family relations that are often the
norm in African societies, and where the better off are
obliged to financially assist their poor relatives to access
health care. Self-interested individuals can be persuaded to
support redistributive mechanisms by emphasising the in-
direct benefits. Also, the findings suggest that a fully
subsidised membership is likely to be met with resist-
ance by the majority. Careful consideration should be
given to the amount of subsidy, such that there is min-
imal if any resistance but at the same time the poor are
enabled to join the CHF. Given that an estimated 34% of
the population [46] will need fully subsidised membership
if Tanzania is to achieve universal health coverage, this
could prove quite a challenge. This underscores the need
for a deeper understanding of the perceptions towards the
amount of subsidy.
Willingness to accept and contribute towards subsidised
CHF membership for the poor
Willingness to accept poor members joining the CHF
without paying the contribution demonstrates some de-
gree of positivity towards solidarity. This was higher
among non-member households, which should not be
surprising given that many of them, being in the poorest
two quintiles, could see themselves as net ‘recipients’ of re-
distributive policies. However, what is surprising is that
these are the same households that decided not to join the
scheme in the first place. The findings show that more
than 80% of non-member households agreed to join if
poorer groups receive a subsidy, while less than 40% were
from households in the lowest wealth quintile. Perhaps
misinterpretation of the question may explain this anom-
aly. It could be that most respondents interpreted the
question as asking for their willingness to join the scheme
with subsidised membership rather than their willingness
to join (without subsidy) while poor households receive a
subsidy. Whatever the case, the question of high willing-
ness to join the CHF at the mention of a subsidy still re-
mains; especially for wealthy households where we can
assume affordability is not an important barrier to joining
the scheme. There may be trust issues regarding quality of
care and scheme management, such that they are only
willing to join with a subsidised membership contribution.
Could the disinclination to join the CHF be a demonstra-
tion of their lack of solidarity with the rest of the commu-
nity? This could be the case if these households have a
lower propensity to need health services and/or can afford
to pay for better quality of care at private facilities that
do not provide services to CHF members. A deeper
understanding of the motives behind these responses is
necessary but beyond the scope of this paper.
It is also interesting to note that among CHF and non-
member households, willingness to contribute to subsi-
dised membership for the poor is lower than willingness
to accept it. This implies that although the majority sup-
port cross-subsidisation of the poor they may not think
it is their responsibility to contribute towards their wel-
fare. A study in Ghana found that people assumed it is
the responsibility of the government, charity organisa-
tions, or the church rather that the community to pro-
vide financial assistance to the poor when they need
health care [30]. The same may be the case for our re-
spondents, but further research is needed to understand
their views on the role of government or other institu-
tions versus the community in assisting the poor.
NHIF households, who may see themselves as the net
‘payers’ in the redistribution, thus, sacrificing the most,
show moderate willingness to contribute towards a redis-
tributive mechanism. Indeed for the NHIF, compro-
mises may include an increased salary deduction with
no direct benefits, while for CHF members and non-
members, this may entail paying higher contributions
but with additional funding for the scheme. These find-
ings concur with theoretical arguments that preferences
for redistribution are motivated by self-interest. Our re-
sults also agree with those of Goudge et. al [41] who
pointed out that high income groups may be guarded
about the financial burden they would have to bear if
they support redistributive policies.
The regression analysis demonstrates that among CHF
households, being wealthy and young is associated with
willingness to contribute to redistributive mechanisms.
This finding is in keeping with the Becker’s [47] theory,
which states that individuals are altruistic, but respond
to the cost of giving. This implies that ability to extend
help to those in need affects their willingness to contrib-
ute to redistributive mechanisms. Therefore households
in the lowest quintile may have the highest support for
subsidised membership of the poor but it may not be
within their ability to contribute and so most refrain
from making a commitment to that end. The same may
apply for households headed by older people who are ei-
ther retired or not earning a living and may not be in a
position to help others, much as the desire exists. Al-
though the results are not significant, the same trends
are observed for NHIF households. Also agreeing with
Becker [47], the analysis predicts among non-member
households, a lower willingness of female-headed house-
holds to contribute towards subsidised CHF membership
for the poor. Indeed, a higher proportion of female-
headed households in the lowest wealth quintile and
with lower education levels were non-members, which
was not the case for CHF and NHIF households. In a
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similar study, Goudge et. al, [41] also found that men were
more willing to pay for health insurance for the poor.
Trust in scheme management is associated with in-
creased willingness among CHF households, although
there does not appear to be a consistent gradient. Indeed
trust in scheme management has been cited as an im-
portant factor influencing acceptance of redistribution
[7]. This is because individuals may support such pol-
icies with the expectation of benefitting at some point in
the future, for instance when retired or when older and
more at risk of needing expensive treatment. Therefore,
individuals must have confidence that institutions will
still be able to deliver the expected benefits at that point
in the future. Trust in insurance schemes goes beyond
the scheme management to include the quality of health
services [48]. Past experience of health care services
and management of the scheme is likely to influence
their willingness to contribute to redistributive mecha-
nisms. Furthermore, the level of trust in the CHF will
influence whether or not individuals feel that their con-
tributions will indeed be put to intended use. Individ-
uals who perceive government institutions to have
limited or non-existent accountability will not have con-
fidence that the poor will benefit from their contribu-
tions. Trust also influences enrolment into the CHF,
hence the constraints of enforcing mandatory health in-
surance coverage in the Tanzanian context and the ne-
cessity of high enrolment for greater redistributive
potential, emphasizes the importance of building trust
in scheme management. It is therefore important that
efforts for improvement be directed at quality of health
services, as well as transparency and accountability in
management of the scheme.
This study sought to explore whether or not a re-
distributive policy between the CHF and NHIF will be
supported. Since this has not been experienced the survey
questions were designed to assess beliefs about notions of
solidarity with the poor and whether or not individuals
are willing to contribute to achieve it. Therefore, we
cannot confidently say that the perceptions expressed will
translate into actual practice of solidarity. Rather, our find-
ings serve as an indication of solidarity, based on
expressed feelings of solidarity. Moreover, the quantitative
approach used meant that the study did not capture the
diverse beliefs about solidarity, for instance the motive
behind support for a partial rather than full subsidy, will-
ingness to accept and contribute towards its achievement,
the specific amount people would be willing to contri-
bute, and the responsibility for assisting the poor to
access health care. Triangulating the study findings with
those from qualitative methods would have provided a
deeper understanding of the beliefs of solidarity. In
addition, the study did not have a clear definition of
‘poor members of the community’, but was based on the
assumption that the poor were those who were ‘finan-
cially poor’ and could not afford the membership con-
tribution. This may have led to the respondents having
different interpretations of who is poor, which may have
affected the results. However, since the study focus was
on enabling those who could not afford to pay the CHF
contribution, it is likely that the majority of the respon-
dents had the same interpretation of who is poor.
Conclusions
This study has shown that the majority expressed support
for redistributive policies, but the findings suggest that the
support and willingness to contribute to its achievement
are influenced by the perceived benefits, amount of sub-
sidy considered, and trust in scheme management. These
present three important issues for consideration when de-
signing redistributive policies. First, perceived benefits of
redistributive policies are an important consideration
given the key position of those who may not benefit dir-
ectly, that is, NHIF and CHF members and wealthy non-
member households. Second, while a partial subsidy is
more likely to be supported, the amount should not be
too low such that the poor cannot meet their share of the
contribution. Lastly, given the interdependence of quality
of health services and scheme management, efforts are
needed to enhance confidence in the scheme to provide
needed services and manage redistributed resources for
the benefit of the poor.
Development of redistributive policies will benefit
from information from qualitative studies focusing on
views on the motive behind support for a partial subsidy,
willingness to accept and contribute towards its achieve-
ment, the specific amount people would be willing to
contribute and the responsibility for assisting the poor
to access health care and the relative importance of
self-interest or altruism in explaining support for and
willingness to participate in redistributive policies.
Endnotes
aIn Tanzania, districts are organised into divisions, which
in turn are divided into wards. Within each ward, there are a
number of villages, which are also divided into hamlets.
Depending on the ward and health infrastructure, one health
facility may have a catchment area of one or more villages.
bThis definition is based on that used by the 2010
Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS).
cPrincipal member is the contributing member of the
NHIF, usually the head of household or spouse.
dEach village has a list of all households registered at the
office of the Village Executive Officer. This list is broken
down by hamlet but does not show membership status.
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